trouble for Republicans this fall, a little-known Democratic physicist won the special election for a far west suburban congressional seat long held by former GOP House Speaker Dennis
Hastert."
1 While this kind of linkage makes for more interesting news copy, the question remains -do these off-cycle elections have any predictive power when it comes to the next general election?
There are reasons to expect special elections to be somewhat predictive inasmuch as national trends that have shifted since the last election ought to affect this isolated election. For instance, if the economy has markedly shifted one way or the other, the voters may be more inclined to reward or punish the party of the president (Tufte 1978 , Kiewiet 1983 . National trends are just that, national, so individual districts will feel, to some extent, a rise or falling economy, or a marked rise or decline in presidential popularity.
At the same time however, there are numerous reasons to be suspicious of the connection between a single election held in a single congressional district has anything important to impart about what will happen in November. First, national forces do not solely determine congressional election outcomes. Indeed, the outcome is going to be as much determined by local factors as it is by the popularity of the president. For instance, a member may have resigned because they got into some kind of ethical hot water, which could influence how voters perceive the would-be successor to the seat from the same party. Or an incumbent may have died and the widow or son of the incumbent may decide to run for the seat. Voters have a history of sending a relative of a recently deceased member of Congress to Washington to finish out a term, so this scenario would also affect election outcomes (Kincaid 1978, Solowiej and Brunell 2003) .
Gaddie, Bullock, and Buchanan (1999) look at special elections and compare them to open seat elections in the general election setting and find that special elections are "subject to most of the same influences as other open-seat contests" (p. 110). They go on to state "special election outcomes that change partisan control can be viewed as the product of normal electoral circumstances and not referenda on the administration" (p. 110). We take this as evidence that there may be some predictive power in the general election that follows a series of special elections.
There is a substantial literature on forecasting congressional election outcomes. attempt to forecast congressional elections in both the mid-term election and the presidential election cycles. In an effort to understand how the primary independent variables used for forecasting congressional elections allow for accurate results, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) craft an intelligent work showing the explanatory power of the variables used in forecasting models. Beginning with Kramer (1971) , Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) report "…he examined the effects of the macroeconomic indicators of inflation, unemployment, and income on House election outcomes in aggregate time-series models," in order to assess the impact of his theory that "when congressional voters judged economic performance to be satisfactory, they voted for the party of the president; otherwise they did not," (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 196) . Building on this research, scholars further adapted the models from the work of Kramer (1971) to include supplemental variables in order to decrease the level of uncertainty when economics does not influence the outcome of elections. Further, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000, 196) cite Tufte (1975 Tufte ( , 1978 stating "[h]e theorized that House elections held between presidential terms were referenda on the economic and political performance of the president,"
showing that the use of presidential approval or coattails and economic performance as forecasting variables was a reasonable approach to predicting election outcomes.
Building on the models created by Kramer (1971) and Tufte (1975 Tufte ( , 1978 
Data and Hypotheses
We collected election outcome data for all special elections to the U.S. House of Representatives from 1900-2008. We measure how well the two parties fare in the special elections several different ways. First, we utilize the results of all special elections in the period between general elections and subtract the number of elections won by Republicans from the number won by Democrats. However, since a party retaining a seat in a special election might not be indicative of much more than a party holding on to a very safe seat, we also use only those special elections in which one party or the other picks up a seat that was previously controlled by the other party. We construct a similar differenced variable for just these elections (number of Democratic pick-ups minus the number of Republican pick-ups). Next, since the frequency of special elections in any two-year period varies (and the secular trend is toward fewer elections over time) we also use the proportion of seats won by Democrats both in terms of all special elections and in terms of those special elections that results in a change of party control.
We gathered the results of the general election outcomes for the same time period, which serve as the dependent variable in our models. The hypothesis we test is straightforward -does the information from special elections prior to a general election predict the general election outcome? Our unit of observation is the general election, so we use all special elections between two elections matched to the general election that immediately follows this period ( Our expectations are tempered by several important facts. First, the frequency and whereabouts of special elections is stochastic, but hard to predict. Someone must leave office, either by resignation or death, in the middle of a term in order for a special election to be called.
Therefore, some years there might be just two or three elections, and in other years there are dozens. The total number of special elections, as well as the number of special elections that results in the change of party control for a seat is depicted graphically in Figure 1 . Clearly there is a wide range of the number of specials and the overall trend of time is fewer special elections.
Most special elections result in the same party controlling the seat, however as we will show later, the few seats in which partisan control changes tend to be a better leading indicator than all specials.
One could imagine that we have a problem with endogeneity. Politicians are strategic (Mayhew 1974 , Fenno 1978 , Jacobson and Kernell 1983 , Jacobson 1989 and Hall and van Houweling 1995 and Cox and Katz (1999) have documented that both incumbents and wouldbe challengers strategically enter and exit the electoral arena. Thus, we could see many special elections when MC's are resigning strategically in anticipation of an upcoming loss in the next general election. These kinds of concerns, while important, are less valid we argue, because while MC's certainly may not run in the next election because they might lose, there is no evidence that they will resign mid-Congress in order to avoid the next election.
=== Figure 1 about here === elections occur in effective isolation, the results of those contests may also depend more heavily on the political dynamic of the constituency and on the political assets that the candidates bring to the contest," believing that the district partisanship is more significant than the national party affiliation (105). Because of this mix of factors we expect special elections, particularly those that result in a change in partisan control (like the Hastert example), to have some predictive power for general elections.
Data Analysis
Since, as we mentioned above, there are complicating factors with the data in terms of a purely linear model. Even if a party has a watershed year in a general election, picking up dozens and dozens of seats, there may have only been 3 special elections in the run-up to the general election. Thus, expecting a strictly linear relationship is a bit questionable. Since the number of special elections has ranged from 3 to 27, with an average number of 12.3 and a standard deviation of 5.5, and neither party can control either the number of special elections nor in which districts they will be held, we examine whether or not a gain in seats during special elections (i.e. just directionality rather than directionality and magnitude) is related to a gain in seats in the general election. Table 1a contains the results of a cross-tabulation of our two dummy variables (did the Democrats win more or fewer special elections than the Republicans and did the Democrats win or lose seats in the general election). This is a test of how well the results of special elections is predictive of the general election. The results show that they are not. When the Democrats lose more special elections than they win, they are equally likely to win or lose seats in the general election. When the Democrats best the Republicans in special elections between general elections, they win seats in the general election that follows 58 percent of the time. The chisquared statistic, not surprisingly, is not significant.
However, when we only use those special elections that result in a change in party control of the seat, the results are very different. In Table 1b we change the independent variable to be -whether or not the Democrats have a net gain of seats as a result of special elections.
This data confirm that there is positive relationship between these variables. When the Republicans have a net gain in special elections they also tend to win seats in the following general election (66.7 percent of the time). For the Democrats, the relationship is even stronger as that they take seats away from the Republicans in the special elections they follow that up with a seat gain in the general election 82.35 percent of the time. The chi-squared statistic shows the null hypothesis of no relationship between these two variables can be rejected.
=== Tables 1a & 1b about We run our all of our statistical analyses twice -the first time using all special election results for our variables of interest, and then again just using those specials that result in a change of party control. Table 2 contains the results of our analysis using all specials. In Model 1, the independent variable is the proportion of seats won by the Democrats that result in a change in party control. The variable ranges from 0 to 1 and we expect it to be positive, which it is. The coefficient is 1.19 and just barely bigger than its standard error. So as in Table 1a , the results of all special elections are not a statistically significant predictor of the general election outcome.
The coefficients for the Midterm Loss and Presidential Coattails variables both take on the expected signs and are significant.
In Model 2 we use just the raw differences in special election outcomes (number of specials won by Democrats minus the number of special elections won by Republicans) as our predictor. While the coefficient is positive, as we expected, it too is not statistically significant. When the Democrats pick up seats in-between general elections, they can usually expect to fare well in the following general election.
=== Figure 2 about here ===

Conclusion
In this paper we sought evidence regarding the validity of the commonly held notion that when the candidates from one political party do particularly well in special elections they can expect to do well in the following general election. This hunch is true to the extent that when a one party takes seats away from the other party in these elections, they generally fare reasonably well in the general. It is also the case that using data on the actual margins of victory from all special elections, including those that result in partisan "holds" has some predictive power for the following general election. These results make sense since special elections are almost always open seat elections, and national forces are likely to impact the outcome of these elections. 5 Clearly many districts are drawn in such a way that one party or the other is almost certainly going to win the seat, but these are not the kind of elections that we found to have much predictive power (i.e. safe districts that elect MCs almost exclusively from one party or the other). Moreover, while we do not deny the fact that local factors can weigh heavily in House elections, there clearly is information about election trends in these isolated events. Given that the location and frequency of special elections is a stochastic process that is hard to predict, it is somewhat surprising that these elections have predictive power at all. The data do demonstrate though that the directionality of seat change (i.e. which party will win seats) is highly correlated to how well the parties do in special elections, and to a lesser degree, so is the magnitude of that seat change.
We are not arguing that this relationship established here is necessarily causal; rather the results of special elections are a barometer of sorts that provide some information about the national political mood, which manifests itself in the general election that follows. One could, however, imagine a causal connection -high quality candidates witness the results of these special elections and interpret the results as an indicator of swing toward their party, which motivates them to run for office. Future research might investigate whether the emergence of high quality candidates is linked to the results of special elections. Vote Margin Difference compares the vote margin between the first and second place finisher in the special election and compares it to the outcome in that district from the most recent general election (see footnote 5 for a full explanation). The Midterm loss takes on values of 1 when it is a midterm election with a Democratic president, -1 when it is a midterm election and a Republican holds the White House, and 0 for on-year elections. Presidential
Coattails is operationalized by taking the Democratic presidential candidate's percentage of the two-party vote and subtracting 50, to center it around zero; the variable is coded zero for midterm elections. Democrats from all special elections that resulted in a change of party control. Vote Margin Difference compares the vote margin between the first and second place finisher in the special election and compares it to the outcome in that district from the most recent general election (see footnote 5 for a full explanation). There are 10 election cycles in which there are no partisan seat changes, for those years this variable is coded as 0. The Midterm Loss takes on values of 1 when it is a midterm election with a Democratic president, -1 when it is a midterm election and a Republican holds the White House, and 0 for on-year elections. Presidential Coattails is operationalized by taking the Democratic presidential candidate's percentage of the two-party vote and subtracting 50, to center it around zero; the variable is coded zero for midterm elections.
